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COUNTING HEADS: THE DECENNIAL CENSUS AND 
ADJUSTMENTS TO ENUMERATION 
Jay E. Town* 
INTRODUCTION TO THE HEADCOUNT 
The 2020 Decennial Census has become a lightning rod for litigious civil 
rights organizations, state attorneys general, and even members of Congress.  
At stake is the apportionment of representatives in the House of 
Representatives and the Electoral College divided amongst the several states.1  
Furthermore, the “headcount” determines the allotment of $1.5 trillion in 
nondiscretionary federal dollars to be distributed to the various states based 
on the persons who are counted in each.2  The headcount is also used in 
redistricting of congressional districts.3  Make no mistake, litigation surrounds 
the manner in which the census arrives at its headcount after every census.  
The 2020 installment will be no different, but the stakes are as high as they 
have ever been. 
The primary issue in the 2020 Decennial Census will be the composition 
of the headcount.  Who must be counted?  Who may be counted?  How is the 
headcount done lawfully if some individuals are excluded, especially in the 
 
 ©  2021 Jay E. Town.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and 
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so 
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to 
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection, and includes this provision and copyright notice. 
 *  Jay Town is the former United States Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama 
and currently the Vice President and General Counsel at Gray Analytics.  Prior to that, Town 
served as an Alabama State Prosecutor and a Judge Advocate in the United States Marine 
Corps.  Town earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from the Univeristy of Notre Dame in 
1995 and graduated from Seton Hall Law School in 1998.    
1 See 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (“[T]he President shall transmit to the Congress a statement 
showing the whole number of persons in each State . . . as ascertained under the . . . 
decennial census of the population, and the number of Representatives to which each State 
would be entitled . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“Each State shall appoint, . . . a 
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which 
the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”). 
 2 See Christi Zamarripa, Report: Census Data Key to $1.5 Trillion in Federal Spending, 
NCSL BLOG (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/blog/2019/11/22/report-census-data-
key-to-15-trillion-in-federal-spending.aspx. 
 3 See 2 U.S.C. § 2c (“[T]here shall be established by law a number of districts equal 
to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled . . . .”). 
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context of illegal immigrants?4  How will the headcount be contested?  These 
are all questions examined here, but all these questions will become 
justiciable questions soon, if not already being considered by the courts. 
Before providing any legal analysis to the census, the constitutional 
framework and statutory requirements upon which the government conducts 
the decennial census require fulsome comprehension.  One must examine 
well beyond the shallows of quoting the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
simply seeks to “count[] the whole number of persons in each State,” prior to 
abridging the constitutional requirements of conducting the census.5  As 
discussed here, the legal architecture that supports a lawful census is a steady 
cascade of delegation from the Constitution to Congress to the Department 
of Commerce to the Census Bureau to the President.  This flow of delegation 
cannot be reduced to an obscure clause in the Constitution but deserves 
historical context and caselaw examination.  In the end, excluding 
noncitizens from the decennial census is lawful if there is a desire by the 
President to do so.  The challenge for the President is doing so lawfully and 
genuinely. 
I.     THE CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSE OF THE CENSUS 
The constitutional purpose of the census is to guarantee equal 
representation in the Congress, determine Electoral College participation, 
and levy direct taxes.6  Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution 
requires that “[r]epresentatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among 
the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers.”7  The Fourteenth Amendment then mandates that 
“[r]epresentatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State”8 as Congress “shall by Law direct.”9  The Fourteenth Amendment 
conjoined with the original Enumeration Clause would then read: 
Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States . . . 
according to their respective Numbers, [counting] the whole Number 
of free Persons [in each state], excluding Indians not taxed.  But when 
the right to vote [in federal elections] . . . is denied to any of the male 
 
 4 Much discussion continues on the verbiage used to describe an individual who is 
“not a citizen or national of the United States.”  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3); see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1325 (describing unlawful entry by a noncitizen).  The terms noncitizen, illegal alien, and 
illegal immigrant are used interchangeably in this Essay without comment or preference as 
to the language designations which span decades of caselaw, the United States Code, and 
various agency policies and directives.  The term “non-inhabitant” is a term of recent 
vintage and likely to emerge more prominently as this debate ensues. 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 6 See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 1; id. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 7 See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 8 Id. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 9 See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
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inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens 
of the United States . . . the basis of representation therein shall be 
reduced [proportionally].  The actual Enumeration shall be made . . . in 
such Manner as [the Congress] shall by Law direct.10 
 
Without oversimplifying the complexity of these Clauses within the 
Constitution, when taken together these Clauses permit the interpretation 
that the number of members in the House of Representatives in each state 
will depend on the number of “persons” within those states and that the 
headcount method shall be directed through legislation by the Congress. 
A. The Direction of the Headcount by Congress 
Congress has “directed” how the “actual enumeration shall be made” 
under the Census Act, which delegates the responsibility of the decennial 
census to the Secretary of Commerce.11  The Census Act is relatively thin on 
details and guidance to the Department of Commerce, which is the agency 
responsible for the conduct of the decennial census.12  The Census Act 
delegates to the Secretary of Commerce the headcount “in such form and 
content as he may determine” and authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to 
utilize “sampling procedures and special surveys” and “obtain such other 
census information as necessary.”13  This authority is vast and wide and hardly 
the exacting language we normally expect from statutory provisions as 
important as this one.  While other statutes restrict the activities of the 
Commerce Secretary, those laws do not produce an austere requirement 
regarding the count.14  Perhaps most importantly, the President is instructed 
to report the enumeration to Congress “[o]n the first day, or within one week 
thereafter,” of the seating of the new Congress.15 
 
 10 See id. (emphasis added); id. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 11 See 13 U.S.C. § 141.  The Census Bureau, which is an agency within the Department 
of Commerce, conducts the census. 
 12 See 2 U.S.C. § 2a (providing the time and manner of the census). 
 13 13 U.S.C. § 141(a). 
 14 In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), the Court did impose a duty on 
the Commerce Secretary “to conduct a census that is accurate and that fairly accounts for 
the crucial representational rights that depend on the census and the apportionment.”  Id. 
at 818–20.  But this still is not a requirement stemming from “such [a] Manner as [the 
Congress] shall by Law direct,” but instead a requirement fashioned by the courts under the 
principles of equity.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
 15 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a).  This is significant every twenty years, 2020 being no exception, 
because the President reports prior to an inauguration if the Administration has changed 
hands.  Thus, the President whose Commerce Department oversaw the census has the 
responsibility to report the enumeration—and thus establish apportionment—potentially 
just days before the inauguration of a new President of the United States. 
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Congress has placed some requirements indirectly by its strictures under 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).16  Also, the APA has recently been 
the subject of interpretation by the Supreme Court as it relates to the Census, 
specifically as to how the APA requires certain levels of transparency by 
Department heads.17  In Department of Commerce v. New York, the high court 
examined the Commerce Department’s intention to include a question  
about citizenship on the 2020 Decennial Census.18  In this case, Secretary of 
Commerce Wilbur Ross issued a memorandum in March 2018 declaring that 
a question regarding citizen status would be added to the census.19  The 
Supreme Court did not block the inclusion of this question on the census 
because of some Equal Protection argument, or a violation of privacy or Due 
Process.20  The citizenship question was ordered removed from the 2020 
Decennial Census due to a technicality arising under the Administrative 
Procedure Act which requires transparency in agency decisionmaking.21  The 
plain reading of this opinion was that the majority of the Supreme Court did 
not believe Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross’s explanation for adding the 
citizenship question but did not rule that such a question was at all 
unconstitutional.22 
B. The Discretion of the Secretary of Commerce and President 
While not unbounded and still subject to judicial review and legislative 
direction, the Secretary of Commerce does have great discretion and 
authority under the Census Act to conduct the census.23  “The Enumeration 
 
 16 See 5 U.S.C. § 552.  The Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929 also limits the 
Secretary’s ability to apportion representatives by affixing the number of representatives at 
435.  See Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, § 22, 46 Stat. 21 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 2a).  
Since Article I, Section 2 requires each state to have a least one House member, there are 
really 385 outstanding seats in the House to be apportioned.  This has traditionally been 
done by giving each state a “proportion” of the remaining 385 seats based on the decennial 
census population count—the headcount—or enumeration. 
 17 See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2567 (2019). 
 18 Id. at 2561. 
 19 Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of Com., to Karen Dunn Kelley, Under Sec’y 
for Econ. Affairs, Reinstatement of a Citizenship Question on the 2020 Decennial Census 
Questionnaire (Mar. 26, 2018). 
 20 See generally Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. 2551. 
 21 See 5 U.S.C. § 706.  While not examined here, the Roberts opinion in Department of 
Commerce v. New York sustained the lower court’s bar of the citizenship question because of 
the “significant mismatch between the decision the Secretary made and the rationale he 
provided” and the “explanation for agency action that is incongruent with what the record 
reveals about the agency’s priorities and decisionmaking process.”  139 S. Ct. at 2575. 
 22 The 2020 Decennial Census will be the twenty-fourth installment of the census.  In 
fact, Justice Roberts’s opinion in Department of Commerce v. New York noted that every census 
between 1820 and 2000 (with the exception of 1840) asked some version of the citizenship 
question and was only recently removed in the 2010 census.  139 S. Ct. at 2561. 
 23 The basis of the Secretary of Commerce’s actions must be reported to Congress 
under the Census Act.  13 U.S.C. § 141(f).  Also, it is important to note that the Secretary 
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Clause of the Constitution does not provide a basis to set aside the Secretary’s 
decision.  The text of that clause ‘vests Congress with virtually unlimited 
discretion in conducting the decennial “actual Enumeration,” and Congress 
“has delegated its broad authority over the census to the Secretary.”’”24  The 
Secretary’s decisions as to how to conduct the census, or otherwise 
enumerate, must bear a “reasonable relationship to the accomplishment of 
an actual enumeration.”25  Moreover, the President has the constitutional 
authority to direct the policy decisions of the Secretary of Commerce to 
include the adjustment of the census enumeration.26  The Supreme Court in 
Franklin stated the Census Act “does not curtail the President’s authority to 
direct the Secretary in making policy judgments that result in ‘the decennial 
census’; he is not expressly required to adhere to the policy decisions reflected 
in the Secretary’s report.”27  The Supreme Court has ruled that the President 
is not constitutionally required to follow the Secretary’s tabulation; therefore, 
“the action that creates an entitlement to a particular number of 
Representatives . . . is the President’s statement to Congress, not the 
Secretary’s report to the President.”28 
Also, the Secretary of Commerce is directed by Congress, by way of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I, to “take a decennial census of 
population . . . in such form and content as he may determine, including the 
use of sampling procedures and special surveys . . . [and] obtain such other 
census information as necessary”29 and shall report to the President “[t]he 
tabulation of total population by States under subsection (a) of this section as 
required for the apportionment of Representatives in Congress.”30  The 
cascade of delegation falls from the Fourteenth Amendment to the Congress 
to the Secretary of Commerce for determination of the appropriate manner 
in which to conduct a decennial census.  The President reports the final 
enumeration to the Congress.31 
It is an incredibly important point, given the holding in Department of 
Commerce v. New York, that the President’s reporting to Congress of the 
apportionment cannot be challenged under the Administrative Procedure 
 
must inform Congress of any changes to the manner in which the Census is conducted 
pursuant to § 141(f) of the Census Act. 
 24 See Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2566 (quoting Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 
1, 19 (1996)). 
 25 Wisconsin, 517 U.S. at 20.  This language is very broad and seems to suggest that any 
reasonable counting mechanism is lawful. 
 26 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 27 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 799 (1992). 
 28 Id. at 797.  It is important to reiterate that, unlike the Secretary of Commerce, the 
President is not subject to the APA and would not have to defend against allegations of 
“arbitrary and capricious” reapportionment. 
 29 See 13 U.S.C. § 141(a). 
 30 See id. § 141(b). 
 31 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a).  This apportionment requirement of the President cannot suffer 
suit under the Administrative Procedure Act. 
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Act.  In other words, the method the President uses to arrive at the 
apportionment number would have to be an unconstitutional method in and 
of itself in order for the apportionment declaration to be challenged 
successfully.32 
C.   Other Uses of the Decennial Census 
Census data is also used for a number of statutory and policy purposes, 
including the allocation of federal funds and the forming of electoral districts 
within the states.33  This means hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funds 
for the individual states.  Census data is further utilized by various federal 
departments for planning, distribution of resources, and allocation of agency 
assets.34  “The census additionally serves as a means of collecting demographic 
information, which ‘is used for such varied purposes as computing federal 
grant-in-aid benefits, drafting of legislation, urban and regional planning, 
business planning, and academic and social studies.’”35  Therefore, census 
data not only has a direct impact on representation in the Congress and the 
Electoral College, but also impacts the amount of federal funds a state will 
receive from the federal government.  Obviously if a seat is gained or lost by 
a state, redistricting would have to occur in those states as well.  The greater 
the headcount for your state the greater the number of congressional seats, 
electoral votes, and federal funds.  Of course, the converse is also true.  It is 
no wonder that states on the cusp of gaining or losing a congressional seat 
have media campaigns encouraging maximum census participation within 
those states.36 
 
 32 A legal challenge would unlikely be sustained simply because the President adjusted 
the headcount provided by the Secretary of Commerce.  The Secretary’s subordinate 
relationship to the President clearly and logically would inhibit such an argument in the 
absence of further congressional direction to do so, which would further complicate 
matters under separation of powers arguments.  Therefore, challenges to the final 
enumeration might best arrive in the form of due process and equal protection attacks.  It 
is important to note that the Supreme Court has not extended Equal Protection Clause 
protections to the census for illegal immigrants and has actually gone out of its way to avoid 
doing so. 
 33 Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1996). 
 34 Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 353 n.9 (1982). 
 35 Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2019) (quoting Baldrige, 455 U.S. 
at 353 n.9). 
 36 See, e.g., Caroline Champlin, California Could Lose a Seat In Congress.  Here’s What 
That Would Mean, KQED (May 31, 2020) 
https://www.kqed.org/news/11821752/california-could-lose-a-seat-in-congress-heres-
what-that-would-mean (describing California’s $187 million census campaign). 
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II.     THE CENSUS BUREAU AND ADJUSTING THE HEADCOUNT 
The Census Bureau has been adjusting the headcount for decades using 
a variety of methods employed by the Secretary of Commerce.37  The 
adjustment of the “headcount” must be done with lawful purpose and, in the 
instance of using data for the adjustment, proof that such data is reasonably 
reliable.38  The litigation that has transpired after most censuses is instructive 
as to how headcount adjustments are constitutionally permissible. 
A.   Census Caselaw 
The census final apportionment is almost always litigated, for one reason 
or another, and typically by states that believe the apportionment or 
apportionment method was disadvantageous.  For instance, in Utah v. Evans, 
the State of Utah challenged a 2000 Census counting practice that caused it 
to lose one congressional representative to North Carolina.39  The Court 
upheld the “hot deck” imputation method of adjusting the headcount to 
arrive at an actual enumeration by stating that “the breadth of congressional 
methodological authority” to arrive at a census number is in the discretion of 
Congress and its delegate, the Census Bureau.40 
In Young v. Klutznick, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that an undercount 
of the population in one geographical area necessarily tends to advantage, by 
virtue of an increase in voting strength, those populations that are least 
undercounted in other geographical areas.41  The Sixth Circuit went on to 
 
 37 See Developing Sampling Techniques, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 17, 2020), 
https://www.census.gov/history/www/innovations/data_collection/developing_sampling
_techniques.html; Imputation of Unreported Data Items, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 3, 2016), 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/technical-
documentation/methodology/imputation-of-unreported-data-items.html. 
 38 There are many resources which can inform the census, or the Secretary, to 
enumerate for the purposes of apportionment.  For example, 13 U.S.C. § 6 permits the 
Secretary of Commerce to “call upon any other department, agency, or establishment of 
the Federal Government, or of the government of the District of Columbia, for information 
pertinent to the [census],” 13 U.S.C. § 6(a), “acquire, by purchase or otherwise, from 
States, counties, cities, or other units of government, or their instrumentalities, or from 
private persons and agencies, such copies of records, reports, and other material as may be 
required for the efficient and economical conduct of the censuses and surveys,” id. § 6(b), 
and “[t]o the maximum extent possible and consistent with the kind, timeliness, quality 
and scope of the statistics required, the Secretary shall acquire and use information 
available from any source referred to in subsection (a) or (b) of this section instead of 
conducting direct inquiries.”  Id. § 6(c).  The President or the Secretary could, and recently 
have, directed the compilation of other available and reliable data to inform the 
reapportionment. 
 39 See Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 458–59 (2002). 
 40 Id. at 474.  The “hot deck” method imputes data that is omitted or unanswered in 
the actual census and does so from other closely related data.  See id. at 458. 
 41 See Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 617, 622–23 (6th Cir. 1981).  The “synthetic 
method” (pro rata distribution of numbers to presumably undercounted areas based on 
the age, race, sex, et. al. of those areas) of adjusting the 1980 Census was the remedy 
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criticize any census scheme that would advantage or disadvantage the “voting 
strength” of the voting population or would introduce “serious distortions . . . 
in any legislative apportionment based on the census.”42  Klutznick continued 
that Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution requires that “‘as nearly as is 
practicable’ one person’s vote is to be worth as much as another’s vote in 
apportioning congressional representation.”43  Klutznick is an important case 
when analyzing who is to be counted and how certain counts could “distort” 
the census and debase voter representation in the Congress. 
In Franklin, the Supreme Court upheld the adjustment of the headcount 
in the 1990 Census by use of Department of Defense administrative data 
despite the possible existence of more accurate data.44  The Court conducted 
a brief analysis of the “[u]sual residence” requirement saying that it means 
not just where you live, but where you have allegiance.45  Further, the Court, 
in discussing when the agency action is “final,” conceded that the President 
could direct a different actual enumeration to be reported by the Secretary.46  
“Unlike other statutes that expressly require the President to transmit an 
agency’s report directly to Congress, § 2a does not.”47  An agency action is not 
final if it is only “the ruling of a subordinate official.”48  Therefore, very little 
prevents the President from amending the headcount after the Secretary 
submits the report to the President or even directing the Secretary to do so 
prior to submission.  For potential litigants, the decennial census still presents 
a moving target, even after the Secretary reports to the President.49  The law 
 
imposed by the District Court.  Id. at 622.  The appellate court essentially ruled that the 
synthetic method would result in distortions or overcounts in those areas that have the 
aforementioned qualities yet participated fully in the census.  See id. at 622–23. 
 42 Id. at 622 (emphasis added). 
 43 Id. at 624 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 527–28 (1969)). 
 44 See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802 (1992).  Note that the data used in 
the apportionment adjustment in Franklin was not Commerce Department data, but 
Department of Defense data, and was deemed appropriate.  Id. 
 45 Id. at 804. 
 46 See id. at 799.  It is again important to note that the President is unlikely to be subject 
to the Administrative Procedure Act because he is not, himself, an “agency.”  Id. at 796.  
This would preclude any “arbitrary and capricious” statutory attacks on the President’s 
adjustment of the enumeration and would, perhaps, leave only constitutional challenges 
(most likely equal protection arguments) by plaintiffs that may struggle with standing issues.  
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) to (B). 
 47 Franklin, 505 U.S. at 797 (listing statutes that require the President to transmit an 
agency report directly to Congress). 
 48 Id. at 797 (citing Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151 (1967)). 
 49 See id.  Because the Secretary’s report to the President carries no direct 
consequences for the reapportionment, it serves more like a tentative recommendation 
than a final and binding determination.  “It is, like ‘the ruling of a subordinate official,’ . . . 
not final and therefore not subject to review.”  Id. at 798 (citing Abbott Lab’ys, 387 U.S. at 
151); cf. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948) 
(explaining how agency action serves as only a recommendation to the President); United 
States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 379 (1940) (discussing how determinations by 
the President in regard to agency recommendations are not subject to judicial review). 
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requires the President to use the census data, but no law suggests the 
President is beholden to the original headcount, proscribed completely from 
adjustment.50  In other words, the census number reported to the President is 
“still subject to correction” by the President before he reports the 
reapportionment number to Congress.51  It would be illogical to assume that 
a subordinate to the President of the United States, even if cabinet-level, could 
“direct” the President to do anything without some legislative or legal 
constraint. 
The most significant recent litigation involving the decennial census 
pertained to the insertion of a question on the census questionnaire 
regarding citizenship.52  “There have been [twenty-three] decennial censuses 
from the first census in 1790 to the most recent in 2010” and “[e]very census 
between 1820 and 2000 (with the exception of 1840) asked at least some of 
the population about their citizenship.”53  In Department of Commerce v. New 
York, the Supreme Court gave standing to the plaintiffs in part because of the 
likely injuries New York would suffer (New York would lose a seat in the House 
of Representatives if illegal immigrants were excluded from the census) under 
the Secretary’s proposed questions for the 2020 Census.54  The Court did 
acknowledge its fundamental concerns with the “sufficiently concrete and 
imminent” injuries of the “diminishment of political representation, loss of 
federal funds, degradation of census data, and diversion of resources” 
resulting from the proposed census.55  While Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
was based in large part on Administrative Procedure Act technicalities, the 
Court illustrated the significance of “genuine justifications” for steps taken in 
any census and reaffirmed that the Secretary of Commerce has enormous 
discretion in taking those steps.56 
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Trump v. New York 
is instructive, to limited degree, as to the direction of future decennial census 
litigation.57  In Trump v. New York, Plaintiffs attacked President Trump’s 
 
 50 Franklin, 505 U.S. at 799. 
 51 Id. at 797. 
 52 See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019). 
 53 Id. at 2561.  Ironically, the justification for the removal of the “citizen question” on 
the 2010 Decennial Census was that increasingly accurate data had already been 
accumulated by American Community Surveys (a sort of mini-census conducted every two 
to three years to a much smaller group of households) and agency data that had been 
accumulated in various Departments.  Id. at 2562. 
 54 Id. at 2565. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 2575; see also id. at 2577 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  While many Supreme Court observers viewed this decision as a loss for the Trump 
Administration, the language of the opinion is instructive to any Administration navigating 
the deep waters of the census.  See Amy Howe, Trump Administration Ends Effort to Include 
Citizenship Question on 2020 Census, SCOTUSBLOG (July 11, 2019, 6:56 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/07/trump-administration-ends-effort-to-include-
citizenship-question-on-2020-census/. 
 57 Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530 (2020) (per curiam). 
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memorandum58 suggesting that illegal immigrants would not be counted—
for the purposes of apportionment of representation only—in the 2020 
Decennial Census.59  The opinion was published on December 18, 2020, or 
around three weeks prior to the President’s reporting of enumeration to 
Congress.60  In Trump v. New York, the Court “express[ed] no view on the 
merits of the constitutional and related statutory claims presented” but 
instead concluded that the claims themselves were “premature.”61 
There was, however, some interesting language that might perhaps 
forecast the fate of future challenges to the decennial census.  For instance, 
the President’s memorandum calls for the use of administrative data to enable 
the exclusion of illegal immigrants from the decennial census “to the extent 
feasible.”62  The Supreme Court countered in its opinion by professing that 
“[e]veryone agrees by now that the Government cannot feasibly implement 
the memorandum by excluding the estimated 10.5 million aliens without 
lawful status.”63  This seems to signal that the quality of the administrative data 
used to exclude illegal immigrants from decennial census apportionment will 
face intense scrutiny.  Conversely, the Government conceded that “the 
[Census] Bureau already possesses the administrative records necessary to 
exclude at least four to five million aliens.”64  The majority did not consider 
the threat of this exclusion—“figures . . . certainly large enough to affect 
apportionment”65—significant enough to deem it a justiciable threat that 
would muster standing or ripeness.  This could potentially be viewed as a 
signal from the high court that using administrative data to impact 
apportionment, while surely to be heavily scrutinized, may be constitutionally 
permissible in this case. 
The Supreme Court has parsed together a tapestry of constitutional 
decisions that collectively propose that there are certain restrictions on the 
conduct of the census, but the final apportionment number—and who is 
included—is not one of them when the justification for adjustments is 
genuine. 
III.     THE ENUMERATION OF “PERSONS” 
Regarding the conduct of the decennial census, both the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and Census Bureau have chosen to rely upon an arguably 
misconstrued interpretation of Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 and the 
 
 58 Excluding Illegal Aliens From the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census, 
85 Fed. Reg. 44,679 (July 23, 2020). 
 59 See Trump, 141 S. Ct. at 534. 
 60 See id. at 530. 
 61 Id. at 536–37. 
 62 Excluding Illegal Aliens From the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census, 
85 Fed. Reg. at 44,680. 
 63 Trump, 141 S. Ct. at 536. 
 64 Id. at 540 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 65 Id. 
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Fourteenth Amendment requirement to “count all persons.”  Both the DOJ 
and Census Bureau’s strained analysis has lacked textual and historical legal 
support and simply—almost lackadaisically—applied the contemporary 
definition of the term.  Candidly, the DOJ instigated this misinterpretation.  
Since DOJ opinions are often persuasive, the adoption of this precedent is 
dangerous when incorrect or inaccurate. 
A.   The Boyd Letter 
It should come as no surprise that the DOJ has weighed in on the 
decennial census reporting requirements from time to time.  The oft cited 
“Boyd Letter” was drafted by the DOJ’s Office of Legislative Affairs Assistant 
Attorney General Thomas Boyd in order to allow him the ability to accurately 
respond to Congress’s interest just prior to the 1990 Decennial Census in 
drafting two bills that would “exclude illegal aliens from the census for 
purposes of apportionment.”66  Often times Congress will ask DOJ whether or 
not a certain legislative action has constitutional authority.  Boyd drafted the 
letter which was promptly forwarded to Congress with an analysis suggesting 
that the legislative action Congress was seeking to take—namely to exclude 
illegal immigrants from the next decennial census—was unconstitutional.  
Unfortunately, this imprudent analysis is flawed. 
The Boyd Letter primarily concerned counting only for the purpose of 
apportionment.67  It properly interpreted the text of the Constitution to mean 
that “the whole number of persons” did not mean voting citizens, and 
subsequent caselaw has agreed.68  It would be ridiculous if the census did not 
count American children, for instance.  However, the Boyd Letter incorrectly 
stated the 39th Congress (1865–67), in order to pass the Fourteenth 
Amendment, “rejected arguments that representation should be based on 
people with permanent ties to the country.”69  Confusingly, the Boyd Letter 
then effectively admitted this mistake by stating that “the Reconstruction 
Congress did not discuss the issue of illegal aliens when it debated the 
 
 66 See Letter from Thomas M. Boyd, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to Representative 
William D. Ford (June 29, 1988), in U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, 1990 CENSUS PROCEDURES 
AND DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT ON THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 240–44 (1988) [hereinafter Boyd 
Letter].  The Boyd Letter was cited by several amici in the conglomerate of litigation 
surrounding this issue before the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Brief of the United States House 
of Representatives as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 24 n.8, Trump, 141 S. Ct. 530 
(2020) (No. 20-366). 
 67 Boyd Letter, supra note 66, at 240 (referencing H.R. 3814). 
 68 Id. at 241.  Note the distinction between “voters” or “voting population” and 
“constituents.” 
 69 Id. at 242. 
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Fourteenth Amendment.”70  The letter also conflated “aliens” with 
“unnaturalized persons.”71 
Most notably, the Boyd Letter relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 
brief analysis of the word “persons” in Plyler v. Doe, a 1982 case.72  The Plyler 
Court recognized that the term “persons” in Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to “illegal aliens”—in this instance, for the purposes of 
the Due Process Clause.73  The Boyd Letter inexplicably leapt to the 
conclusion that surely the “persons” referred to in the Section 2 
“Enumeration Clause” of the same Amendment must apply to illegal 
immigrants as well.74  Of course, apportionment was not at all an issue in Plyler, 
which was about Texas funding K–12 education for noncitizen children.75  
The letter then hastily concluded that “[illegal] aliens must be included 
within the census for purposes of apportioning congressional 
Representatives.”76  The Boyd Letter has been the flawed “law of the land” in 
terms of the decennial census ever since.77  The undeniable problem is that 
the Boyd Letter relied in large part upon faulty logic and a misconstrued 
reading of Plyler, as discussed herein.  This analysis has unfortunately 
permeated census-related litigation and policy discussions ever since. 
B.   Plyler vs. The Boyd Letter 
A textual analysis of the term “persons” requires more than the analysis 
provided in the Boyd Letter.  As the Boyd Letter admits, “illegal alien” was 
not a term in the lexicons of the Framers or the 39th Congress.78  The 
discussion of “unnaturalized aliens,” as cited in the Boyd Letter, imprecisely 
conflates “aliens” and “unnaturalized aliens” with modern day “illegal 
immigrants”—arguably three different categories of people.79  The Boyd 
Letter noted that the Fourteenth Amendment naturalized “[a]ll persons 
born . . . in the United States,” including all black Americans.80  However, 
 
 70 Id. at 243. 
 71 Id. at 241–42 n.4.  I do not suggest criticism here to harangue the Department of 
Justice or Acting Assistant Attorney General Boyd himself.  I am simply pointing out the 
false comparisons made openly in the letter that have gone unquestioned for decades. 
 72 See id. at 242–43. 
 73 Id. (discussing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)). 
 74 Id. at 243. 
 75 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205. 
 76 Boyd Letter, supra note 66, at 243–44. 
 77 Over the past thirty years, the Boyd Letter is often cited by plaintiffs, appellees, and 
amici in litigation evolving from a given decennial census, most recently cited by Appellees 
in Trump v. New York, discussed above. 
 78 See Boyd Letter, supra note 66, at 243.  The 39th Congress (1865–67) passed the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which was later ratified in 1868. 
 79 Id. at 241–43, 241–42 n.4. 
 80 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  It is important to note that the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 thankfully gave citizenship rights to blacks and former slaves.  The 39th Congress did 
talk about unnaturalized aliens during the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Boyd 
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expressly applying the term “persons” in a modern legal analysis to include 
“illegal aliens” requires too broad an assumption of definitions not 
contemplated at the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which are the definitions that matter most.81 
Also, the Boyd Letter offers extraordinarily strained comparisons to the 
language in Plyler and the lexicons of the Framers or the 39th Congress.  The 
primary rationale offered by the Boyd Letter is that if the term “persons” in 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to illegal alien children, as 
it did in Plyler, then surely the term “persons” in Section 2 of the same 
Fourteenth Amendment applied to all illegal aliens for the purposes of 
apportionment.82  In other words, if the Supreme Court says Texas has to let 
illegal immigrant “persons” attend their schools, then surely the Supreme 
Court would agree that all illegal immigrant persons must be counted, 
enumerated, and apportioned accordingly by the decennial census. 
But the Supreme Court in Plyler offered no such textual or historical 
context for its holding.  In fact, the Plyler Court admitted that it applied the 
term “person” in the “ordinary sense of [the] term,” not according to some 
textual or historical analysis rooted in Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence.83  This is a critical failing of the Boyd Letter—and the 
cornerstone of the Boyd Letter’s arguments for inclusion—because its legal 
analysis of Plyler and the term “persons” is postured falsely in a historical 
context ostensibly relying upon dicta from Plyler, while the Supreme Court in 
Plyler confesses that this very dicta, and its analysis of the term “persons,” was 
only offered in the “ordinary sense” circa 1982.  This distinction is significant 
since the linchpin of the Boyd Letter’s rationale hinges almost entirely on this 
faulty analysis of Plyer and the flawed historic analysis of the term “person.” 
C.   The Headcount Memo 
To confuse matters further, DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) 
generated a memo in 1994 that contradicts the Boyd Letter in how it 
 
Letter, supra note 66, at 241–42 n.4.  However, this was in the context of their naturalization 
upon ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  There was no context for a significant 
remainder of unnaturalized aliens after ratification, as is the case today.  Nothing dictates 
that unnaturalized aliens are the same as illegal aliens in any legal context or framework.  
By extreme example, if the virtue of being “here” offered the same constitutional 
protections (e.g., Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, Privileges and Immunities, 
etc.) as being “legally here” then 8 U.S.C. § 1325 would be unconstitutional.  See infra note 
124.  It is also not insignificant that legal aliens and citizens pay “direct taxes,” which are 
also part of the census statutory rubric.  See infra notes 126–27. 
 81 Even if one is not an originalist or textualist, it is intellectually dishonest to apply a 
current definition to an original or historic definition when it is clear, with very little 
research, that the terms have changed over the past fifteen decades.  The Boyd Letter takes 
a contemporary approach to constitutional interpretation under the guise of textual 
arguments, which makes it impossible to arrive at the conclusions the Boyd Letter did. 
 82 See Boyd Letter, supra note 66, at 242–43; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 83 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (emphasis added). 
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addressed the manner in which all persons are counted.  In other words, the 
“Headcount Memo” addressed whether data could augment, supplement, or 
substitute a physical headcount. 
The Headcount Memo specifically addressed headcount enumeration 
adjustment census issues.84  Unlike the issues raised in the Boyd Letter, the 
Headcount Memo discussed only how to count, not necessarily who to count.  
OLC Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger conducted a thorough 
analysis as to the permissibility of “statistically adjusted census figures” and 
whether the administration of a census including such adjustments was 
constitutional and legal under the Census Act.85  The memo stated boldly, in 
stark contrast to the Boyd Letter, that “[t]he Constitution ‘provides the basis 
for the decennial censuses, but does not specify the details of their 
administration.’”86 
The memo admitted that the primary constitutional purpose of the 
census “is to provide the basis for Congress’s apportionment” and the 
Electoral College, while also noting that the censuses are often used to 
develop other demographic data and statistics for myriad purposes, such as 
federal funding and redistricting.87  In further analysis, the memo stated that 
the first Census Act in 1790 directed the counting of “[i]nhabitants.”88  Most 
notably, the Headcount Memo suggested that nearly every census, including 
the first census in 1790, involved the overcounting or undercounting of one 
group or another and that adjusting the enumeration with data can correct 
this disadvantage.89 
Citing Klutznick and the Census Act, the Headcount Memo directly 
disagreed with previous opinions by the Census Bureau; the memo 
contradicted the Bureau’s prior position that the use of data was 
constitutionally and statutorily impermissible since the census was to be “a 
headcount[] and nothing but a headcount” and resisted interpreting the 
tenet that “count all persons” to mean a literal accounting of all humans in 
the United States each decade.90  The Headcount Memo noted the Great 
Compromise of the Constitutional Convention designed a census that was 
 
 84 Memorandum from Assistant Att’y Gen. Walter Dellinger, Off. of Legal Couns., to 
Solic. Gen. Drew Days (Oct. 7, 1994), in 18 OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL OF 
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONSISTING OF SELECTED MEMORANDUM 
OPINIONS ADVISING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND 
OTHER EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO THEIR 
OFFICIAL DUTIES 1994, at 184–98 (1999) [hereinafter Headcount Memo]. 
 85 Id. at 184.  The Secretary aimed to use “sampling” to adjust the enumeration.  Id. 
 86 Id. (citing J. Howard McGrath, Seventeenth Decennial Census, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 
31, 32 (1949)). 
 87 Id. at 185. 
 88 Id. at 185 n.3. 
 89 See id. at 184–85. 
 90 Id. at 188 (citing Young v. Klutznick, 497 F. Supp. 1318, 1332 (E.D. Mich. 1980), 
rev’d, 652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1981)).  Despite the Bureau’s insistence, censuses have been 
adjusted by data for decades. 
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based on numbers—actual enumeration—not some negotiated number by 
politicians or outright conjecture.91  The memo further points out that the 
method of arrival at an enumeration was left to Congress to decide as they 
deem fit by way of the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 18.92  And “[i]t would be strange indeed to suppose that Congress—or 
its delegate, the [Census] Bureau—lacked the power to authorize a statistical 
adjustment” to right some sort of perceived wrong resulting from the initial 
decennial census.93  Citing Franklin, and undergoing an Administrative 
Procedure Act analysis as to whether such changes would be impermissibly 
arbitrary or capricious, the Headcount Memo said “the validity of the policy 
change [to use data to adjust the headcount] would turn largely on the 
evidentiary showing that the use of statistical adjustments” will reasonably 
advance correcting the wrong that is cited for the purpose of the change. 94  
The constitutional goal of the census is to determine representation, and that 
determination can be arrived upon by any means where the decennial census, 
in the judgment of the Secretary of Commerce or the President, is “rendered 
more accurate by feasible adjustments.”95  “Neither the Constitution nor the 
Census Act precludes the Bureau from making . . . statistical adjustments of 
‘headcount’ data in the decennial census . . . .”96  “Moreover, a ‘complete 
enumeration’ or ‘full census’ may affirmatively require statistical adjustments 
of ‘headcount’ data to be made,” especially in those instances where suffrage 
is impacted negatively.97  The memo concludes by stating that the Census 
Bureau can adjust the way it counts to arrive at the “actual Enumeration.”98 
Unfortunately, the Headcount Memo has gained little traction in legal 
circles since it described how to count rather than who to count, and 
administrations have relied heavily on the Boyd Letter instead. 
D.   “Persons”—Inhabitants vs. Illegal Aliens 
The textual or historical meaning of “persons” is then critical to 
understanding the apportionment requirements of not just Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment but the original apportionment tenets of Article I, 
Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution as well.  Ample evidence supports the 
conclusion that the Framers’ definition of “persons” was consistent with 
“inhabitants.”  This would exclude illegal aliens under historic or modern 
 
 91 See id. at 188–89. 
 92 Id. at 190. 
 93 Id. at 191 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880)). 
 94 Id. at 192; see also id. at 191 nn.14–15.  An “evidentiary showing” is a basic term of 
art suggesting the data used to adjust the headcount must be reliable and accurate.  
Obviously, this only becomes relevant when the apportionment is litigated after the 
enumeration is reported to Congress by the President. 
 95 Id. at 196–97 (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 806 (1992)). 
 96 Id. at 198. 
 97 Id. at 194. 
 98 Id. at 188, 191–92 (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 806; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3). 
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interpretations in the context of the census.  Because the Census Clause99 
itself is somewhat ambiguous, the process of interpreting its meaning should 
include an effort to determine how the Framers themselves understood the 
language they adopted.  The Framers’ understanding of the original provision 
was that apportionment would be based on the relative number of inhabitants 
of the states and initial drafts of the Apportionment Clause even used the term 
inhabitants rather than “persons.”100  The Constitutional Convention (or 
Federal Convention) of 1787 is shrouded in language regarding 
representation in the Congress being based on the proportional number of 
inhabitants in each state.101  It is reasonable to conclude that at the time of the 
Framing of the Constitution the word “inhabitant” was to mean a person with 
principal and continuing residency in a state, which necessarily includes 
citizens, in the context of a census.102 
The Federalist Papers are also particularly instructive on the use and 
meaning of the term “inhabitants” in the context of apportionment.  For 
instance, Federalist No. 42 discussed the value of citizenship and residence 
when defining “inhabitants.”103  Federalist No. 43 discussed inhabitants having 
“their voice in the election of the government.104  Federalist No. 54 argued that 
“[it] is a principle of the proposed Constitution, that . . . the aggregate 
number of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by 
a federal rule founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants.”105  Also, 
Federalist No. 55 stated that “[w]ithin three years a census is to be taken, when 
the number may be augmented to one for every thirty thousand 
inhabitants.”106  The terms “constituents” and “inhabitants” were used 
interchangeably107 and a “census of inhabitants” was the vernacular when 
 
 99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 100 Charles Wood, Losing Control of America’s Future—The Census, Birthright Citizenship, 
and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 476 (1999) (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 590, 595 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937)).  There seems 
to be at least some evidence that the term “inhabitant” was meant to be considered a 
stronger term than “resident.” 
 101 Id. at 477.  There is no language that suggests that “persons” and “inhabitants” 
were intended to mean something different.  In fact, they seem to have been used 
interchangeably.  The Committee on Style, which was like the modern-day legislative 
reference service, “replaced the phrase ‘citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex and 
condition’ with the single word ‘persons’ in the description of how the states’ ‘numbers’ 
were to be counted.”  Id. at 476–77 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, supra note 100, at 585, 590, 641). 
 102 Id. at 479. 
 103 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 266–67 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961).  This article was addressing, among other things, the privileges and immunities of 
citizens versus aliens among the several states.  The word “inhabitant” apparently connoted 
a more stable and permanent connection than “resident,” continually defined as being 
situated as a bona fide member of a state having stability and longevity within that state. 
 104 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 103, at 269 (James Madison). 
 105 THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, supra note 103, at 335 (James Madison). 
 106 THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 103, at 340 (James Madison). 
 107 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 56 (James Madison). 
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discussing apportionment.108  Moreover, the original Census Act of 1790 was 
entitled “[a]n act providing for the enumeration of the Inhabitants of the 
United States,” despite the original Apportionment Clause referring to the 
count of “persons.”109 
This historical analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 1964 
decision in Wesberry v. Sanders in that apportionment was to be based on the 
relative number of “inhabitants” of the various states: 
The debates at the Convention make at least one fact abundantly clear: 
that when the delegates agreed that the House should represent 
“people” they intended that in allocating Congressmen the number 
assigned to each State should be determined solely by the number of 
the State’s inhabitants.  The Constitution embodied Edmund 
Randolph’s proposal for a periodic census to ensure “fair 
representation of the people,” an idea endorsed by Mason as assuring 
that “numbers of inhabitants” should always be the measure of 
representation in the House of Representatives.110 
Understanding the Framers’ meaning of the word “inhabitant” then becomes 
significant.  “The debate at the Constitutional Convention over the provisions 
relating to qualifications of members of Congress shows that an ‘inhabitant’ 
was understood to have a longer-term connection to a state than a mere 
‘resident.’”111  The contemporary dictionaries of the time understood 
“inhabitants” to require in its definition some minimum degree of longevity.  
Samuel Johnson’s 1785 Dictionary defined “inhabitant” as a dweller or one 
who resides in a place and defined an “abode” as a “habitation” or a “place 
of residence” that is continual.112  Webster’s American Dictionary of 1828 
defines “inhabitant” as a dweller who resides permanently.113  “Dweller” was 
defined as “a resident of some continuance in a place.”114  The definition to 
this day is “one that occupies a particular place regularly.”115  Also, it seems 
 
 108 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 supra note 103, at 354 (James Madison). 
 109 See An Act Providing for the Enumeration of Inhabitants of the United States, § 1, 
1 Stat. 101, 101 (1790).  This is just more evidence of the contextual interchange at the time 
between “persons” and “inhabitants.” 
 110 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1964) (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed. 1911) (footnotes omitted)). 
 111 Wood, supra note 100, at 478. 
 112 Inhabitant, 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 
1785); Abode, JOHNSON, supra. 
 113 Inhabitant, NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(1828). 
 114 Dweller, WEBSTER, supra note 113.  This analysis seems to conflict with the current 
“Residence Rule” and “usual residence” primer.  See 2020 Census Residence Criteria and 
Residence Situations, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/decennial-census/2020-census/about/residence-rule.html (Feb. 25, 2020) (noting 
that a person’s “[u]sual residence” is “where a person lives and sleeps most of the time” 
and “is not necessarily the same as the person’s voting residence or legal residence”). 
 115 Inhabitant, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/inhabitant (last visited Mar. 14, 2021). 
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logical that representatives would be designed to represent a “constituency,” 
which is defined commonly as the “group or body that patronizes . . . or offers 
representation” or “a body of citizens entitled to elect a representative.”116  
This is significant because only citizens can vote and the group represented, 
even if unable to vote, patronizes the representation. 
Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting the definition of 
“inhabitants” has changed, nor that the word “persons” was meant to include 
individuals beyond those with the attributes of inhabitants, between 1790 and 
1868.117  Without question, “person” and “inhabitant”—or constituents—
were used interchangeably in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2, the clause just 
before the Enumeration and Apportionment Clauses, further suggesting 
inhabitant and person had similar legal meanings.118  A person that is a 
“representative” must be an “inhabitant” and shall be “apportioned” 
according to their respective numbers by adding the “whole Number of free 
Persons.”119  This is important because illegal immigrants cannot vote in 
federal elections much less serve as members of Congress.120  Just three years 
removed from the drafting of Article I, in 1790, the first Census Act required 
“enumeration of the Inhabitants.”121  It is reasonable to conclude that the 
same Congress that just approved Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, the 
Enumeration Clause, in 1787, which refers to “whole number of free persons” 
and “three fifths of all other persons,” interchanged “inhabitants” when they 
passed the Census Act of 1790 three years later.  It is also rational to conclude 
that the construction of those constitutional provisions, along with the 
definitions of those words, are similar or even identical.  The language clearly 
suggests that certain types of persons make up the sum of inhabitants.122  
When considered in its proper historical context, it is evident that more than 
presence is required to be included in the enumeration of inhabitants.  
Substantial, if not permanent, ties to a residence were understood to be 
included in the meaning of inhabitant at the time of the ratification of both 
Article I of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.123  These 
 
 116 See Constituency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/constituency (last visited Mar. 14, 2021). 
 117 Wood, supra note 100, at 477. 
 118 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 119 U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2. 
 120 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not 
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United 
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be 
chosen.”). 
 121 See Census Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 101, 101. 
 122 Other Supreme Court cases, such as Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1127 (2016), 
and District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–80 (2008), offer some further analysis in 
the modern context of the Framers’ intent as it related to “persons” and the “body politic.” 
 123 The 1860 Census Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 forms counted “Free Inhabitants” and 
“Slave Inhabitants,” respectively.  NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECS. ADMIN., 1860 CENSUS 
SCHEDULE 1; NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECS. ADMIN., 1860 CENSUS SCHEDULE 2.  Much like in 
1790, compliance with the original Enumeration Clause required the count of inhabitants. 
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definitions are meaningful when distinguishing between who must be counted 
and who may be counted. 
E.   “Persons” and Adjustment of the Residence Rule 
If “persons” or “inhabitants” are properly taken in the historic 
vernacular, then a lawful justification would permit excluding illegal aliens 
from apportionment because they are not inhabitants under the original text.  
Illegal immigrants could be considered outside the population that 
constitutes the body politic in the context of the census.  Under the historic 
definitions, most, if not all, illegal immigrants today lack the sufficient nexus 
to a residence such that it could be deemed “permanent” or “substantial.”  It 
is reasonable to conclude that illegal aliens, who have refused to conform to 
our nation’s laws and norms of American society,124 enjoy limited 
constitutional rights or protections,125 do not pay126 the full spectrum of 
federal direct taxes,127 and thus cannot all be said to be considered 
 
 124 The term “illegal immigrant,” by its very nature, suggests a failure to comply with 
the immigration laws of the United States, of which there are many.  For instance, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1325, offers criminal and civil penalties for failure to abide by American immigration laws.  
Moreover, as a result of unlawful immigration, the United States expends hundreds of 
billions of dollars investigating, policing, detaining, imprisoning, and deporting 
noncitizens.  See The Cost of Immigration Enforcement and Border Security, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 
(Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/the-cost-of-
immigration-enforcement-and-border-security. 
 125 For instance, it is a federal crime when an illegal immigrant possesses a firearm 
despite the guarantees under the Second Amendment.  See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).  Also, 
noncitizens may not vote in a federal election, despite the assurances of such a protected 
right enjoyed by citizens under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 611.  This is not to imply that illegal immigrants have no rights under the 
U.S. Constitution.  They clearly do.  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“Aliens, 
even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as 
‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); see 
also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
 126 It is a misnomer that illegal immigrants pay no federal taxes.  Any employed illegal 
immigrant earning a wage in the normal course within a legitimate employer relationship 
(not cash or “under the table” wages) will have federal payroll taxes involuntarily deducted 
directly by their employer and paid to the IRS.  A 2014 report from the Internal Revenue 
Service approximates that illegal immigrants paid $9 billion in payroll taxes the previous 
calendar year.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IMMIGRATION AND TAXATION (2014), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/20-Immigration%20and%20Taxation.pdf.  However, the 
overall tax revenue to the IRS for personal taxes in 2013 was over $2.4 trillion.  See INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, 2013 DATA BOOK 12 (2013), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/13databk.pdf. 
 127 It is not insignificant that the Constitution includes in the Apportionment Clause 
specific language regarding direct taxes.  Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 states that 
“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may 
be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers.”  U.S. CONST. art I, 
§ 2, cl. 3.  Article I, Section 9 prohibits Congress from levying direct taxes or “capitation” 
unless in proportion to the census or enumeration.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.  These Clauses 
may not be entirely dispositive, but they certainly are significant in distinguishing between 
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“inhabitants” with sufficient connections to a state.  Because the Constitution 
and the Congress are both silent as to how to define “persons” or 
“inhabitants,” a textual analysis is necessary until such time as there is a 
constitutional or statutory effort to address this issue.  And until such time as 
Congress chooses to act on the status of certain individuals as it relates to the 
headcount, those original, textual definitions will remain in the discretion of 
the Secretary of Commerce and the President. 
 
IV.     GENUINE JUSTIFICATIONS TO ADJUST THE HEADCOUNT 
 
Genuine justifications128 must accompany any adjustment to the census 
headcount and any steps taken in, or changes to, the census must bear a 
“reasonable relationship” to achieve the constitutional and statutory purposes 
of the census.129  The “injury” anticipated by the Secretary of Commerce must 
be honest, legitimate, and reasonably related to the protection of those who 
would be injured.  Not wanting to count illegal immigrants out of some 
negative racial bias would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and 
likely other federal statutes, and therefore not survive constitutional scrutiny.  
However, if desirable in the discretion of the Secretary and ultimately the 
President, there are several legitimate, genuine purposes to adjust the 
headcount in the decennial census. 
A.   Vote Dilution 
The right to vote and be represented in the Congress is both a 
constitutional right and privilege uniquely limited to United States citizens, 
the diminishment of which is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.130  
 
“illegal aliens” and “legal aliens.”  In addition to enjoying rights approaching citizenship, 
legal aliens pay direct taxes (see Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), for a fulsome 
discussion on direct taxes.).  Much of the caselaw regarding direct taxes arose after the first 
census and remains instructive in the contemporary context. 
 128 It is important to note that the likely judicial review in a matter like this one would 
be intermediate scrutiny, which requires an important government interest (e.g., getting 
apportionment right) and that such government action does so by means that are 
substantially related to that interest.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).  
Moreover, it is also important to give separate analysis as to whether an aggrieved party in 
this case would have standing to sue.  An illegal alien, or group representing the same, 
might lack the redressability and standing necessary to pursue an action against the 
Secretary or the President. 
 129 See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566 (2019) (citing Wisconsin v. 
City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 20 (1996)). 
 130 The “Right to Vote” exists in the U.S. Constitution in the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, 
and Nineteenth Amendments.  The Apportionment Clause provides the framework for the 
Electoral College.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  The Privileges and Immunities Clause also 
grants rights fundamental to citizenship, which includes the franchise of suffrage.  U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 2.  Also, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments guard against disenfranchisement.  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.  
There is no functional or political difference between diluting the value of a citizen’s vote 
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The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,131 along with the Comity Clause, 
provide constitutional equal protection to citizens from overreaching (or 
underwhelming) state action, to include disenfranchisement.  These 
constitutional provisions, taken together in the context of the decennial 
census, allow the Secretary of Commerce to appropriately apportion electors 
and seats in the lower chamber using a count that does not disenfranchise, 
debase, diminish, or distort the voting rights of all inhabitants of the several 
states.132 
Moreover, any identification of legislative action by a state, or permissive 
defiance or discrete inaction by one of the several states, could be deemed to 
impact the franchise or suffrage of constituents by diluting the votes of 
persons living in otherwise law-abiding states.  Generally, myriad federal 
courts have held that “[t]he right to vote is one of the badges of citizenship” 
and that “[t]he dignity and very concept of citizenship are diluted if 
noncitizens [impact suffrage].”133  The notion of diluted or distorted 
apportionment was addressed obliquely in Colegrove, wherein Justice Black 
opined in his dissent that “[t]he purpose of [Section 2 of the 14th 
Amendment] is obvious: It is to make the votes of the citizens of the several 
States equally effective in the selection of members of Congress.”134  “[T]he 
 
and reducing, by distorted means, the number of a citizen’s representatives or that citizen’s 
collective appraisal in the Electoral College. 
 131 The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects only 
those rights “which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, 
its Constitution, or its laws.”  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 754 (2010) (citing 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873)). 
 132 Vote dilution is a cognizable injury and Northern District of Alabama District Judge 
David Proctor, in ongoing census litigation, has cited at least three cases in support of that 
contention.  Alabama v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 396 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1050–51 (N.D. Ala. 2019) 
(citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801–03, 824 (1992); Dep’t of Com. v. U.S. 
House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 331 (1999); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 458–64 
(2002)).  Alabama going from 700,000 citizens per congressman to 810,000 citizens per 
congressman is “vote dilution.”  Id. at 1050.  There is no real issue that the vote of an 
Alabama citizen will be diluted.  The dispute will be whether or not the Census Bureau’s 
application of the Residence Rule is the cause of that dilution, and thus a redressable, 
impermissible practice under the U.S. Constitution or the APA. 
 133 Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998); see also, e.g., Reyes v. 
City of Farmers Branch, 586 F.3d 1019, 1023–24 (5th Cir. 2009); Negrn v. City of Miami 
Beach, 113 F.3d 1563, 1567–69 (11th Cir. 1997); Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 
1425 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Townsend v. Holman Consulting 
Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 134 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 570 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting).  The Colegrove 
case was a state districting case, not involving the apportionment values of the several states, 
and was decided on the narrow grounds that there is no requirement in the Constitution 
that state congressional districts be apportioned equally.  Id. at 553–54 (plurality opinion).  
Illinois had passed a law, and carved out congressional districts, where in some cases a 
congressional district would have one-ninth the size of the larger districts, thereby 
diminishing or watering down the votes and representation of citizens in those larger 
districts.  Id. at 557 app. I.  Justice Black continued by arguing that “[t]he probable effect 
of the 1901 State Apportionment Act in the coming election will be that certain citizens, 
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right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of 
a citizen’s vote” as if the citizen was denied the right to vote altogether.135  
Additionally, the stated goal in City of New York explained that the census 
cannot “relieve the federal government of the obligation to make a good-faith 
effort to achieve voting-power equality.”136 
The injury genuinely justified to be redressed by the Secretary’s potential 
discretion in the present context is to avoid the vote dilution and debasement 
of the legal resident, persons, constituents, and inhabitants of the several 
states that do not defy federal immigration laws or otherwise have an 
inordinate amount of illegal aliens present.  In other words, the Secretary 
would be making a good faith effort to ensure that every state, and those voting 
in it, had voting-power equality amongst and between all of the states.  
Eliminating some or all illegal immigrants from the “actual enumeration,” 
and thus final apportionment, may be the only way, considering current 
demographics, to genuinely accomplish this good faith effort of achieving 
“voting-power equality.”137 
B.   Voter and Representative Debasement 
The Supreme Court, on a number of occasions, has determined that 
having a relative number of equal constituents in a single congressional 
district is a constitutional requirement.138  When states draw congressional 
districts that are not relatively equal in numerical constituency, the Supreme 
 
and among them the appellants, will in some instances have votes only one-ninth as effective 
in choosing representatives to Congress as the votes of other citizens.  Such discriminatory 
legislation seems to me exactly the kind that the equal protection clause was intended to 
prohibit.”  Id. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting).  It is important to note that while this was a 
dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, noted that 
constitutional jurisprudence “eventually moved in [the] direction” of Justice Black’s theory.  
561 U.S. at 763. 
 135 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
 136 City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 34 F.3d 1114, 1129 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 137 This is especially true given that many states and cities have policies in place which 
attract illegal immigrants despite knowledge of the Department’s previous willingness to 
count and apportion based off of the count of all human beings present, as opposed to “all 
persons” or “all inhabitants.”  It may be necessary to carve out segments of the full number 
of illegal aliens, versus simply all illegal aliens.  While it may be a legitimate interest to carve 
out all, it is at least worthy of an analysis to determine if any segments of the illegal alien 
population might be counted.  For instance, the group of children identified in Plyler may 
apply.  Other groups (e.g., overstayed visas, aliens with orders of final deportation, etc.) may 
be worthy of examination to determine “permanent” ties to residency.  Conversely, it is also 
worth considering that an equal protection argument may exist should such distinctions 
among illegal aliens be made, thus resulting in the ultimate conclusion that all noncitizens 
should be subtracted from the apportionment enumeration.  These considerations should 
be made when narrowly tailoring any reapportionment policy. 
 138 See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123–24 (2016); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
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Court has declared such state action a justiciable debasement of suffrage.139  
There is little difference in the analysis between unequal congressional 
districts drawn within one state or the lot of congressional apportionment 
drawn amongst the several states. 
When a congressional district in a law-abiding state has more legal 
residents, more citizens, and more constituents, such demographic realities 
should not disadvantage that district over another with fewer constituents.  
This would be an unequal distortion of democracy.140  Representatives who 
represent a greater number of constituents theoretically have more contact 
with constituents and legal residents.  More issues.  More mail.  More calls.  
More visits.  More demands for legislative services.  More competition.141  
Conversely, those with fewer legal residents in their district would have fewer 
representative duties to fulfill.  Less mail.  Fewer issues.  Fewer calls.  Less 
competition for reelection.  Less threat of their district disappearing.  In fact, 
while untenable, the current “Residence Rule” makes it possible for an entire 
district to be comprised of only a single voting resident: the congressman.142  
This logical extreme would be an entirely “hollow district.”  This recognizes 
the legal and logical incongruity of rewarding states that actively undertake to 
defy federal immigration laws with additional representation in Congress 
while those states in obedience of federal law lose or merely maintain seats.  
It would be reasonable to conclude that apportionment that rewards 
lawlessness—by the illegal aliens and the local, county, and state entities that 
harbor them—is not in the democratic interests of the republic. 
By way of example, imagine that each congressional district in the 
United States has roughly the same number of human beings living there, say 
750,000.  Those 435 districts are apportioned accordingly.  If each of the 435 
 
 139 See generally Baker, 369 U.S. 186. 
 140 While not discussed here, it is a reasonable goal of the census to encourage lawful 
naturalization as well.  This goal might be accomplished, at least incentivized, by the 
exclusion of illegal aliens from the census, thereby encouraging the states that harbor illegal 
aliens to encourage or otherwise support naturalization. 
 141 
In the 2018 election in the five congressional districts where the largest 
share of the voting-age population were not citizens, only 132,000 votes 
were cast on average.  In the five districts with the smallest non-citizen 
shares, 232,000 votes were cast on average.  If nothing else, it means it takes 
far fewer votes to win a House seat in a district where a large share of adults 
is made up of non-citizens . . . [and] has created a situation in which the 
votes of American citizens living in low-immigration districts count much 
less than those of citizens is living in high-immigration districts. 
STEVEN A. CAMAROTA & KAREN ZIEGLER, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE IMPACT 
OF LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ON THE APPORTIONMENT OF SEATS IN THE U.S. HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES IN 2020 (2019).  This is a clear illustration of both voter debasement 
and dilution. 
 142 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 114 (explaining how a person’s “[u]sual 
residence . . . .  is not necessarily the same as the person’s voting residence or legal 
residence”). 
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districts were comprised of nothing but U.S. citizens, then there could be no 
debasement argument because the districts are represented evenly and 
similarly.  Now imagine that only 400 districts are comprised of nothing but 
U.S. citizens, and the remaining thirty-five districts are each comprised of 50% 
illegal immigrants.  Those illegal immigrants often do not pay direct taxes,143 
cannot vote in a congressional race,144 and are, by definition, living inside the 
United States without lawful permission.145  Is it fair to the districts full of 100% 
citizens to have incongruent access to their congressmen as compared to the 
districts comprised of only 50% citizens?  Is it fair that an equal share of federal 
funding be allotted to those districts?  Is it fair that a vote cast in a “half-full 
district” is twice as powerful as a vote cast in a “full district”?  What if instead 
of 50% illegal immigrant composition in a district, it was 80%?  90%?  What if 
there were so many illegal immigrants that a new district needed to be created 
altogether to accommodate the apportionment requirement?  What if the 
“full district” was lost to that new district?  Is it fair that a state now loses a seat 
in Congress and an electoral vote because of an accumulation of illegal 
immigrants in another state?  Fewer congressmen may mean a diminished 
ability to direct needed funds and programs to your state, its citizens, and its 
constituency.  Is that penalizing citizenship? 
These are the realities of the census.  If even one of these examples seems 
unfair, then that is the debasement argument.  Accordingly, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the President, or the courts through litigation would be genuinely 
justified in redressing this inequity in a given census framework, and adjusting 
the headcount would therefore bear a reasonable relationship to the 
constitutional purposes of the decennial census. 
V.     THE USE OF “OTHER DATA” IN THE HEADCOUNT 
The census has always been viewed as a physical headcount.  However, 
data has been used to supplement the census for decades with little 
cacophony.146  The Headcount Memo certainly offers that conclusion.  
However, this all seemed to change when, on July 11, 2019, President Donald 
Trump issued an executive order which noted that “it is imperative that all 
executive departments and agencies . . . provide the Department [of 
Commerce] the maximum assistance permissible, consistent with law, in 
determining the number of citizens and non-citizens in the country.”147  This 
executive order directly allows the use of administrative records maintained 
by any federal or state agency for the purpose of ensuring “that accurate 
 
 143 See discussion supra note 126. 
 144 See 18 U.S.C. § 611. 
 145 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101. 
 146 PATRICK J. CANTWELL, HOWARD HOGAN & KATHLEEN M. STYLES, U.S. BUREAU OF 
THE CENSUS, IMPUTATION, APPORTIONMENT, AND STATISTICAL METHODS IN THE U.S. 
CENSUS: ISSUES SURROUNDING UTAH V. EVANS 1–4 (2005). 
 147 Exec. Order No. 13,880, 3 C.F.R. 339 (2020). 
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citizenship data is compiled in connection with the census by other means.”148  
Section 3 of the executive order lists a number of sources for this data, 
including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), Department of 
Homeland Security customs and border arrival data, Department of State 
passport data, various data collected through federal government health care 
coverage systems, and even relevant state administrative data.149  A recent 
federal lawsuit in Alabama underscores just how prominent “other data” 
might play in an apportionment analysis.150 
On January 20, 2021, President Biden issued a competing executive 
order regarding the headcount.151  Specifically, this executive order reversed 
President Trump’s executive order regarding census data collection and 
apportionment and stated that “[t]his policy conflicted with the principle of 
equal representation enshrined in our Constitution, census statutes, and 
historical tradition.  The policy further required the Census Bureau to 
inappropriately rely on records related to immigration status that were likely 
to be incomplete and inaccurate.”152  The Biden executive order states that 
American laws 
do not permit the exclusion of inhabitants of the United States from 
the apportionment base [sic] solely on the ground that they lack a 
lawful immigration status.  Reflecting this legal background, and the 
values of equal representation and respect that the Constitution and 
laws embody, it is the policy of the United States that reapportionment 
shall be based on the total number of persons residing in the several 
States, without regard for immigration status 
and that “[i]t is likewise essential that the census count be accurate and based 
on reliable and high-quality data.”153  The terms “persons” and “inhabitants” 
seem to be used interchangeably within President Biden’s executive order, 
which may be a significant legal argument for the proponents of 
apportionment exclusion so long as the data used to do so is “reliable” and of 
“high quality”. 
Alabama Attorney General Steve Marshall and U.S. Congressman Mo 
Brooks (AL-5), both Republicans, filed a lawsuit in federal court in the 
Northern District of Alabama on May 21, 2018.154  This lawsuit was at least 
partially in response to the Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and 
Residence Situations Rule put forward by the Census Bureau on February 8, 
2018, which provided that illegal aliens155 would be counted in the 2020 
 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 343. 
 150 Alabama v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 396 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1050 (N.D. Ala. 2019). 
 151 Exec. Order No. 13,986, 86 Fed. Reg. 7015 (Jan. 25, 2021). 
 152 Id. at 7016. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1, Alabama v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 396 F. Supp. 
3d 1044 (N.D. Ala. 2019) (No. 2:18-cv-00772). 
 155 Alabama’s complaint defines “illegal aliens” as “persons who are present in the 
United States by virtue of either illegal entry in violation of federal immigration statutes or 
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Decennial Census and their number will be allocated and apportioned to the 
state wherein they live.156  This promulgation by the Census Bureau, referred 
to commonly as the “Residence Rule,” is the focus of the litigation based upon 
Alabama’s belief that it will lose one congressional seat and one electoral vote 
if the census were to continue per the current Residence Rule rubric.157 
The general nature of Alabama’s suit alleges that the inclusion of illegal 
aliens in the 2020 Decennial Census is a violation of the U.S. Constitution and 
the APA.158  The complaint details how the count of illegal aliens for the 
purposes of apportionment would cause harm to Alabama in the form of vote 
dilution, diminished representation, and a redistribution of political power to 
states with greater concentrations of illegal immigrants.159  The suit examines 
the Census Bureau’s definition of the Residence Rule and attributes this 
definition to the prospective harm Alabama would suffer by losing one 
congressional seat and one electoral vote with those seats being reallocated 
from Alabama to a state with a larger illegal alien population, thus diluting 
Alabama’s representation in Congress and the Electoral College.160  The 
plaintiffs also seek judgment to prevent the inclusion of illegal aliens in the 
final census, per the current adoption of the Residence Rule, for the purposes 
of the distribution of federal tax dollars.161  Essentially, Alabama seeks to avoid 
the loss of a congressional seat and an electoral vote, regardless of the legal 
sequence providing that desired outcome. 
A.   Numbers Matter 
To prosecute its case, Alabama has employed a series of experts to 
provide data and statistics of the imminent harm to the state’s representation 
in the House and the Electoral College.  Reliable statistical support seems to 
be readily available for Alabama’s contention that including illegal aliens in 
apportionment harms Alabama and other states with higher proportions of 
 
who have entered the United States legally but have remained present in the country 
beyond the period of time permitted by federal law.”  Id.  at 1 n.1.  The antithesis of this 
definition, for the purposes of this memorandum, would then be “legal residents.” 
 156 Id. at 2. 
 157 The “Residence Rule,” as currently defined by the Census Bureau, would count 
illegal aliens as part of the census based upon where those illegal aliens “live and sleep most 
of the time,” otherwise known as the “usual residence” definition.  Id. at 7.  Ironically, there 
does not appear to be any question on the 2020 Census that asks where the “usual 
residence” of an illegal alien might be, although other questions at least try to determine 
how long someone has lived in the United States.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUESTIONS 
PLANNED FOR THE 2020 CENSUS AND AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE 
AND PROGRAM USES 59 (2018), 
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2020/operations/planned-
questions-2020-acs.pdf. 
 158 Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 154, at 3. 
 159 Id. at 11–15. 
 160 Id. at 2, 15. 
 161 Id. at 18–20. 
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citizens while benefitting states with greater numbers of illegal aliens.162  For 
instance, the 1980 Census resulted in New York and California gaining 
congressional seats, and two other states losing one, due to the count of illegal 
immigrants.163  A study of the 1990 Census indicates that California and Texas 
both gained House seats, these two states reflecting the greatest populations 
of illegal aliens.164 
Also, Department of Homeland Security data indicated that in 1996 the 
estimated total of illegal immigrants in the United States was approximately 
five million people, with approximately forty percent of all illegal immigrants 
living in California.165  DHS reported that total number rose 240% by 2014 to 
a population of over twelve million, ninety-one percent of whom were over 
the age of eighteen.166  California and Texas host over forty percent of all 
illegal aliens and the top five states (add Florida, New York, and Illinois) house 
nearly half of the twelve million illegal immigrant population in the United 
States.167  Of the current number of illegal immigrants, two-thirds have lived 
in the United States for at least a decade.  The Public Policy Institute of 
California released a study in 1996 wherein it concluded that “undocumented 
immigration to California was at a relatively low level during the early 
1980s,”168 yet in 2014 California housed an estimated 2.9 million illegal 
immigrants.169  Moreover, in 1996, Texas housed approximately 700,000 
illegal immigrants,170 yet DHS estimates that by 2014 there were 1.9 million 
illegal immigrants residing in Texas, which is a 175% increase.171  This data 
 
 162 It is worth exploring further how the advent of “sanctuary cities” and “sanctuary 
states” may have induced illegal aliens to travel to, and remain, in those sanctuary polities. 
 163 Wood, supra note 100, at 470 (citing Hearing on Enumeration of Undocumented Aliens 
in the Decennial Census Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Gov’t Processes 
of the Sen. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong. 14–15 (1985) (testimony of John Keane, 
Director, Bureau of the Census)). 
 164 Id. (citing Steven A. Camarota, Leon F. Bouvier, Hong Dan, Godfrey Jin-Kai Li & 
Dudley L. Poston, Jr., Remaking the Political Landscape: How Immigration Redistributes Seats in 
the House, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUDS. (Oct. 1, 1998), https://cis.org/Report/How-
Immigration-Redistributes-Seats-House).  Apparently, the Census Bureau did not conduct 
the same study it conducted after the 1980 Census because of “sensitivit[ies]” to 
immigration issues.  Id. 
 165 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ILLEGAL ALIEN RESIDENT POPULATION 1 (1996), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Unauthorized%20Immigrant%20P
opulation%20Estimates%20in%20the%20US%201996.pdf. 
 166 BRYAN BAKER, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2014, at 5–6 (2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Unauthorized%20Immigrant%20P
opulation%20Estimates%20in%20the%20US%20January%202014_1.pdf. 
 167 Id.  This “Top 5” has not changed in terms of rank since the 1980s. 
 168 HANS P. JOHNSON, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL., UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION TO 
CALIFORNIA: 1980–1993 viii (1996), 
http://www.iicanet.orgwww.ppi.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_996HJR.pdf. 
 169 BAKER, supra note 166, at 5. 
 170 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 165. 
 171 BAKER, supra note 166, at 6. 
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suggests a direct correlation between in-state illegal alien population and 
apportionment.  Due in part to an influx of illegal immigrants, California has 
gone from forty-five seats in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1984 to its 
current number of congressmen at fifty-three and went from forty-seven 
electoral votes in the 1984 election to fifty-five in 2020. 
Because the data is significant, and Alabama has compiled reliable, high 
quality data, the Census Bureau’s motion to dismiss was denied, and the case 
remains active.172  District Court Judge David Proctor’s Memorandum 
Opinion denying the Census Bureau’s motion to dismiss found that Alabama 
had both standing for redress and also had alleged cognizable injuries such 
that dismissing the case would be a miscarriage of justice at this point.173  
Much like the Headcount Memo’s assertions, the plaintiffs in the Alabama 
case will rely on data to assert the fundamental unfairness viewed by counting 
illegal immigrants in the decennial census.  If the Secretary of Commerce or 
the President do not adjust the headcount based on what Alabama would 
assert is a “genuine justification,” the federal court in the Northern District 
of Alabama might do it for them.174 
 CONCLUSION 
The decennial census is altogether a civic ceremony and scientific 
enterprise.  The imputation of data and statistics to aid in the accuracy of the 
census, or abate against illegitimate state action, has been utilized over the last 
several censuses.  A physical headcount is not the only method in which the 
decennial census is conducted.  Datasets and other aids to determine the 
population have been widely accepted.  In fact, the Supreme Court has said 
repeatedly that the use of accurate statistical procedures is appropriate. 
The Supreme Court has never decided whether the decennial census 
must count illegal immigrants or whether the Secretary of Commerce or 
President can direct, by constitutional and lawful legitimate governmental 
purpose, that illegal immigrants be excluded from the final enumeration for 
 
 172 Alabama v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 396 F. Supp. 3d 1044 (N.D. Ala. 2019) (denying 
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 173  Id. at 1046. 
 174 I do not contend that any court could force the President of the United States or 
the Secretary of Commerce to include or exclude certain groups (e.g., illegal immigrants) 
prior to reporting the decennial census apportionment number to Congress.  However, I 
do believe it is a legitimate cause of action to make voter debasement, voter dilution, and 
other related constitutional claims once the apportionment number is reported and 
cognizable injuries are realized.  So, to the extent that Alabama is seeking to direct the 
President to do anything prior to the apportionment report to Congress, I would argue that 
such is likely not a valid legal exercise of Article III powers by the District Court.  However, 
a district court could find constitutionally valid purpose to “adjust the headcount” based 
on some or all of the arguments discussed herein after the apportionment number has been 
reported.  There are then really two questions relevant here:  (1) can the President exclude 
illegal immigrants in his/her discretion?; and (2) if the President refuses to do so, are there 
remedies available to disenfranchised states?  I believe the answer to both questions is yes. 
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the purposes of apportionment.  The contention then is simply that the 
Secretary of Commerce or President may count illegal immigrants for the 
purposes of apportionment but are not constitutionally required to do so.  
The cascade of delegation from the U.S. Constitution to the Congress to the 
Census Act to the Census Bureau to the Secretary of Commerce to the 
President of the United States makes no such judgments and offers no such 
requirements.  Should illegal immigrants be counted for the purposes of 
apportionment, and such a count disadvantages, distorts, or debases citizens 
in other states, then it would be a legitimate cause of action by the 
disadvantaged state to seek to adjust the apportionment through the courts 
on these constitutional premises. 
It should not be a constitutional reality that the greater proportion of 
citizens in a state results in fewer congressional seats.  It would be a distortion 
of democratic principles for the number of seats in the Congress or Electoral 
College to swell in a state where the actual constituency has not.  This would 
offer perverse incentives to bolster the size of a state’s congressional 
delegations—and their impact on presidential elections—by encouraging 
illegal immigration and encouraging illegal immigrants to domicile in states 
looking to tip the congressional and electoral scales in their favor.  Welcoming 
those who violate the laws of the land should not have its advantages. 
The decision to count illegal immigrants rests with the Secretary of 
Commerce and ultimately the President.  Unless and until such time as there 
is either a constitutional amendment or Congress directs the Secretary to 
enumerate specific groups, the Secretary of Commerce or the President will 
remain constitutionally and statutorily empowered to exclude illegal aliens in 
reapportionment in order to serve legitimate government interests that 
include protecting the franchise of suffrage, guarding against vote dilution 
and representative diminishment, and encouraging lawful naturalization.  
These legitimate governmental interests are reasonably advanced by omitting 
illegal immigrants from the final apportionment enumeration reported to 
Congress by the President.  There again, the President is not required to 
exclude illegal immigrants from the enumeration either.  The point is that 
exclusion is a constitutionally available correction to apportionment. 
The core constitutional purpose of the decennial census is to arrive at 
the “actual enumeration” of the people of each state so that the people of 
each state are fairly and adequately represented in Congress and the Electoral 
College.  Our system of laws and our Constitution simply cannot support the 
contention that there may be disadvantages to citizenship when determining 
headcount advantages for citizens. 
